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Shot and Counter-shot 
Presence, Obscurity, and the Breakdown of Discourse in 
Godard’s Notre Musique 
Burlin Barr 
Central Connecticut State University 
The dream of the individual is to become two. 
The dream of the state is to become one. 
- Notre Musique 
 
Setting and Siting—Frames for Discourse 
 Notre Musique includes a lengthy sequence that involves a presentation 
by Godard on the relationship between text and image. The occasion of the 
lecture is a conference in Sarajevo titled European Literary Encounters, an 
annual event first organized in 2000. Godard gave his lecture in 2002 and the 
long middle-section of the film offers a "lightly fictionalized restaging" of his 
address and of other encounters surrounding the conference.1 The narrative 
setting of the majority of this film, then, is a space of discourse (a conference 
and a lecture), but I suggest that the film is conceptually sited more 
generally and abstractly in the "space" or “frame” of discourse itself. Because 
it ponders various parameters—spatial, historical, conceptual—that allow or 
disallow discursive connection, I regard Notre Musique as an extended 
meditation on the possibilities for and barriers to discourse. By siting the 
film in Sarajevo, Godard is clearly highlighting a frame for this meditation—
a frame that includes a history of violence and reconciliation. The conference 
is decidedly international and takes place in a city with a rich cosmopolitan 
and multi-ethnic history, even as it bears the scars of violence and ethnic 
division.  Sarajevo, moreover, is a city with a complex relationship to the 
state—having been a nucleus to various formations of state and empire in 
the last century. In its history and in the present, Sarajevo is a site of 
discourse and discord; of the union and clash of influences (be they 
religious, political, or ethnic). Hence, Sarajevo’s relevance to the film is not 
merely one of documentary fidelity (because it was the host city for the 
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conference). It is a perfect site for Godard to pursue a line of reflection on 
discourse and its breakdown in the frame of changing formations of power. 
Sarjevo as a site also calls attention to how the parties or constituencies for 
discourse remain in states of flux—either through processes of self-definition 
from within or misrecognition (or nonrecognition) from without.  
 Sarajevo, as setting and site, also encourages another emphasis: that 
discourse “takes place” in the frame of military violence and its aftermath. 
The film addresses this construct both in formal and thematic terms. Notre 
Musique is structured in a Dantesque triptych form and literally places the 
long middle section on discourse (which the film labels “purgatory”) 
between one “panel” which features ongoing war (labeled “hell”) and 
another imagining a state of blissful permanent militarization (labeled 
“paradise”). The violence that the film foregrounds is organized, communal, 
and sanctioned. It is the violence of state, and the epigraph for this essay, 
quoted from the film, implicitly regards the state as a barrier to any form of 
discourse. The state is a formation trending to the solipsistic and subjecting 
the “other” to various forms of erasure. Following the sentiment offered in 
epigraph, formations of state (which we can regard as a collective 
subjectivity) challenge individual subjectivity, which seeks out and even 
requires difference (and therefore, discourse). 
 Notre Musique is fundamentally preoccupied with scenes of listening, 
speaking, interviewing, interpreting, translating, reading, hearing, mis-
hearing, recognition, and non-recognition. It is a polyglot and quotation-
laden film that foregrounds language difference, as well as spoken and 
written texts. Important sections of the film, moreover, take place amid two 
sets of ruins—a library (Bosnia’s national library in Sarajevo) and a bridge 
(the 16th-century bridge in Mostar) —both of which were destroyed in the 
Bosnian war and both of which assumed high symbolic value. These 
physical sites work as concrete, visual entities that further the film's 
representations of discourse, impasse, connection, and disconnection. These 
ruins (which are also scenes of re-construction) serve as constant reminders 
of the breakdown of discourse (during the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina) and 
of the fundamental difficulty or even impossibility of reconciliation and 
forgiveness. And although the film is deeply engaged with geo-political 
conflict as experienced in such places as Sarajevo, Mostar, and Srebrenica, it 
would be an oversight to say that the film restricts itself to such a topic. 
Godard’s lecture in the film on text/image offers a compelling reminder that 
the breakdown of discourse, as well as moments of impasse and non-
recognition, remain a pervasive staple of daily life, among allied 
constituencies and even more so among divided ones.  
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Fragmented Space 
 Well into the film, during a short and seemingly transitional sequence 
(it would be a misnomer even to call it a scene) Godard presents us with two 
voices mired in conflict. We do not see the speakers, but are offered instead a 
busy street scene of Sarajevo in the early evening, as if this conflict is 
background noise to everyday life. We do not know the substance of the 
quarrel; the very notion of a quarrel’s “substance” seems in fact to be part of 
the quarrel. What, after all, constitutes the content or substance of a conflict? 
What kinds of conflict can be reduced to clear and unchanging components? 
The two voices in this exchange suggest that the need to agree on terms for 
communicating have overtaken the quarrel itself, which has become almost 
entirely a meta-conflict. The exchange is brief: 
Voice 1: You never answer. But I will say nothing. What I say is 
nothing. 
Voice 2: See to it that I can speak. 
Voice 1: Any idea how I can go about it? 
Voice 2: Convince me that you hear me. 
Voice 1: Talk to me. 
Voice 2: How can I talk if you don’t hear me? 
Concise as it is, this exchange is laden with different varieties of speech acts, 
from commands (see to it; convince me; talk to me) to accusations (you 
never answer; how can I . . .  if you don’t). Assertions and questions overlap 
and each utterance is highly overdetermined. We are left with two parties, 
both of which appear to be aggrieved, in a conflict seemingly beyond 
reconciliation. The exchange, moreover, remains abstract. Aside from the 
fact that one voice is male and the other is female, the speakers are 
unidentified and could be speaking from almost any position of 
estrangement (the alleged offenses could political or personal). Additionally, 
the film never positions itself in relation to either voice. Spectators are not 
offered this exchange as a conflict of one established character versus 
another; subjectivities remain abstracted and generic. There is no mechanism 
of identification available to the viewers. It is a conflict of other/other. This 
sequence, when considered with other sequences of the film (most notably 
the lecture sequence and the sequences involving the native Americans—
which I discuss below), shows Godard introducing the question of being 
“placed” in terms of constituency or subjectivity. From what position do 
people speak? And how does the position of enunciation allow, disallow (or 
both) the conditions of hearing, recognition, and discourse? 
 Godard’s lecture sequence, though much longer and less abstract than 
the brief sequence mentioned above, ends in a similar moment of impasse. 
The sequence concludes with a question/answer period that follows 
Godard’s lecture. A student (who remains unseen) asks, “ Can the new little 
digital cameras save the cinema?” Godard never answers the question. His 
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response is one of stony silence. As Godard sits in silence we see him from 
the front, but he is backlit and in near darkness (figure 1).  
 
(An image of inaccessibility. Godard in stony and unresponsive 
silence during the question/answer period.) 
It is an image of profound inaccessibility, and at the heart of the image 
is Godard himself. Godard’s silence is cancelling. His silence has the effect of 
not acknowledging the other—even as the image reaffirms his own 
presence. The tenor of inaccessibility, however, extends to the student as 
well whose question is a non sequitur: it responds to nothing from Godard’s 
lecture and falsely presumes a shared agenda with Godard. The student’s 
question seems less an inquiry than a wish to be corroborated. Godard’s 
silence strikes me as response to this unstated desire for corroboration.  
 By including this image of impasse and inaccessibility, with himself at 
its center, Godard creates a mise-en-abyme in which the process of filming 
and the filmmaker are folded into its representational field. It is important to 
the scene that we do not see the student ask the question. While Godard is 
visually confirmed, the identity of the student remains suppressed and 
deferred (we learn her identity much later near the conclusion of the film— 
she is one of the film’s fictionalized characters—and with that knowledge 
her question assumes a gravitas that was absent at the moment of its 
iteration). Although the scene does not make light of the student’s question, 
it never fully acknowledges her person or her position of enunciation. 
Visually, she is without place. Yet her voice emerges from this unseen space 
of obscurity with an urgent force. Although Godard is not employing a 
formal practice to heighten or diminish either side of the exchange, the scene 
creates an undeniable structure of identification with the Godard 
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“character,” and it leaves us with a sense of impasse and imbalance. Because 
the identity of the student is deferred, her position of enunciation is 
obscured and the possible relevance of her question is lost. With this 
sequence, Godard creates planes of action or planes of time, which cause 
individual subjectivities to “flicker”—to emerge or to disappear. The student 
and her question seem irrelevant at one moment, and urgent at another. This 
presentation of time is not used to describe cause and effect, or to produce a 
historicist grid, or to apply a sensible linearity to events, but to demonstrate 
the radical contingency of subjectivity itself. Godard repeats this formulation 
of time and space in the unusual sequences which feature the Native 
Americans as they strive to be recognized. Godard represents processes of 
both self-definition and recognition as highly fluid and unstable in the film, 
and he does so specifically through cinematic thinking: through his 
renderings of time (and also space) which grant a character voice or which 
leaves her in obscurity. 
 Just as Godard creates discrete planes of time, he also creates planes of 
space, and he does so most acutely during the lecture sequence. The 
sequence features a lengthy discussion of the cinematic staple of the 
“shot/counter-shot” sequence, and interrogates its most classic and 
commonplace application. As part of the lecture, and as part of the lecture 
scene, we see Godard re-configure both cinematically and theoretically the 
apparatus of that construct (I use the term apparatus in the sense of 
dispositif—not as a technical assemblage, but as an ensemble of factors that 
regulate the relation between viewer and image). Godard reminds his 
audience that “the shot and reverse shot are basics of film grammar.” 
Producing two stills from a classic shot/counter-shot sequence he states, 
“but look closely at these shots from the Hawks movie. You'll see that it's the 
same thing twice.  That's because the director is incapable of seeing the 
difference between a man and a woman.” Godard clearly eschews the well-
used shot/counter-shot formula as a means to articulate continuity of 
space—to render a shared space for two people. Godard sees the 
shot/counter-shot sequence as an analytic instrument for revealing and 
interrogating difference and renders instead a contested and even fractured 
space. The sequence features several pairings of shots that de-emphasize the 
shared physical architectural space of the lecture hall and call attention 
instead to a contested space of discourse. The shots emphasize space in 
planes or layers that invariably isolate some participants as objects of focus 
while holding others in a position of obscurity (figures 2-3).    
7 0  |  S h o t  a n d  C o u n t e r - s h o t  
Journal of French and Francophone Philosophy  |  Revue de la philosophie française et de langue française 
Vol XVIII, No 2 (2010)  |  jffp.org  | DOI 10.5195/jffp.2010.213 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(Multiple planes of space during the lecture sequence. Godard uses 
shallow focus and highy restricted lighting to creates numerous 
planes for the different constituencies of the scene. Several 
individuals are always in visual obscurity and become phantom-
like. This is one means by which Godard posits otherness.) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Godard clearly renders six (and perhaps more) different layers of space in 
the lecture hall in which he is speaking: the spaces of Godard, the 
interpreter, the image-texts under discussion, and at least 3 starkly different 
articulations of students and on-lookers. These differences are reinforced as 
well through the sound mix, which layers the voices of Godard, the 
interpreter, and the students as they respond to Godard or speak and laugh 
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among themselves. No master shot unifies these planes of space, and we are 
left with a space that is persistently fractured and literally out of focus. 
 Godard’s cinematic practice in this scene – in terms of focus, sound, 
and editing—does not merely establish a mise-en-scene in which he 
communicates a set of ideas in the form of a lecture. Indeed, the lecture—
which is accompanied by a gallery of images—is substantive and fascinating 
in its own right, but it remains fragmented (the scene runs just over 6 
minutes—a fairly long scene, but a very short lecture), and to limit the 
scene’s content to the transcribed content of the lecture itself would be to 
overlook the major work Godard undertakes here. This scene, and others in 
the film, clearly support Deleuze’s comment that “Godard transforms 
cinema by introducing thought into it. He didn't have thoughts on cinema, 
he doesn't put more or less valid thought into cinema; he starts cinema 
thinking.”2 The complexity of this space, with it’s various planes of focus, 
time, and sound, serves only to underscore the greater complexity of 
contested spaces beyond the protected confines of the university forum. One 
could say that the connection between Godard and the students is tenuous 
because there is a connection, one created to a large degree by the socio-
cultural apparatus of the university. This institution provides a space whose 
primary purpose is the expression and contestation of ideas, and this space 
is delimited and defined by consensus.  
 
Militarized space and the subject of violence 
  If this space is as fractious as Godard creates it, then how does one 
consider, think about, and render other public spheres—those defined 
without consensus and delimited by military force and its afterlives. I use 
the term “afterlives” here to invoke a notion of consequence and remainder, 
because much political process is an afterlife of military force: military force 
has established a set of conditions in which politics must operate. Indeed, 
early in the second part of the film as we see different participants arriving 
in Sarajevo for the conference, several look off-screen and remark on the 
presence of SFOR (Stabilisation Force in Bosnia and Herzegovina). “What is 
that?” asks one character. Another responds in a matter-of-fact tone: “SFOR. 
Germans today. Americans tomorrow. Next week: Russians, French, 
Italians.” To follow this off-screen look, one might expect a counter-shot to 
reveal the off-screen space. Not surprisingly, Godard withholds it and 
thereby SFOR becomes a kind of invisible frame held off-screen. To say that 
Godard “withholds” the counter shot may be a misstatement because it 
implies that the shot has been posited; in many respects one could say that 
the shot has never even been conceived. Yet, it is true also that this shot 
already has been asserted: extrinsic norms and generic conventions of 
narrative cinema have already done so; as Godard states in the lecture 
sequence, “the shot and reverse shot are basics of film grammar” and when 
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the characters look off-screen and make statements on the presence of SFOR, 
Godard has presented viewers with a compelling set of expectations. Yet 
Godard’s resistance to (or rebellion against) the classic shot/reverse-shot 
structure emerges in a context of assertion, because he establishes other 
cinematic norms in this film. So what is accomplished here? What kind of 
cinematic thinking is Godard accomplishing through the intrinsic norms of 
this film? In his interview on the film, Godard speaks in a Vertovian vein 
about the uniqueness of the camera as an analytical instrument:  
One needs a camera to see certain things. The majority of films 
today are filmed without using the camera as an investigative tool - 
instead of drawing on this analytical power during filming, people 
substitute a great mass of explanation: 'I meant to do this. I meant 
to do that.' Whereas a scientist or chemist who uses a microscope 
needs that microscope.3 
I assert that here, and elsewhere in the film (especially the lecture scene and 
the bridge scene), Godard is configuring the cinematic apparatus with 
several ideas in mind: One idea takes into account the profound 
social/subjective ramifications of the classic two shot system. One may 
easily take for granted how the point-of-view shot—or the classic counter-
shot, which Godard almost categorically refuses to use in this film—
establishes the individual point-of-view as valid and essential. It posits a 
model of subjectivity that is simplistically stabilized and in which the 
individual is placed in arbitrarily polarized and rigid contexts. The 
shot/counter-shot formation is exquisitely isolating in its narrowness. It is a 
system in which autonomous, individual egos exert an almost totalitarian 
power over viewer perceptions. Such a system eradicates alterity, by 
attempting to contain it. Otherness is channeled into the classic 
shot/counter-shot formation, and never allowed to resonate as otherness. 
Countering such a formation, Godard offers, for example, the fractured 
formations of the lecture sequence. Other scenes rethink the counter-shot as 
well. The initial conversation between Godard and the interpreter at the 
beginning of the second part of the film is presented as an exchange 
witnessed by a silent third party, rather than as an isolated conversation 
between two individuals (figures 4-5).  
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(A shot/counter-shot sequence from early in the second part of the 
film. These are two shots from a conversation between Godard and 
an interpreter. The young woman is a third and silent party to the 
conversation. She is in both frames of the shot/countershot and acts 
as a kind of witness, while Godard and the interpreter never appear 
together in the frame. This sequence posits the young woman as an 
“other” or a third eye, and breaks down the dominant positions of 
the classic shot/countershot system.) 
 
Such formations posit otherness without accounting for it or attempting to 
assimilate it.  
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 A second and related point turns to another of the principle features of 
cinema itself: how does one represent time and space on the screen? As 
mentioned earlier, Godard’s cinematic renderings of space and time in the 
film have nothing to do with establishing narrative continuity, but concern 
the establishment of subjective presence, attention to subjective erasure, and 
how such presences and absences figure discourse and conflict. When one of 
the film’s fictionalized characters— an idealistic reporter from Israel—
arrives in Sarajevo, she seeks out the French ambassador for an interview. 
As she tries to convince him to be interviewed, they have the following 
exchange: 
Reporter: I want to speak to the man, not the ambassador.  
Ambassador: Which man? 
Reporter: Lyons, 1943. 
Both the ambassador and the reporter implicitly agree on the certainty of 
split subjectivities, and the reporter’s focus on “Lyons, 1943” posits a 
subjectivity defined by time, space, and war. These renderings of space and 
time in the context of the film finally beg several broader questions. What 
are the delimiters of space? Can we conceive of geopolitical space without 
the military establishment and patrol of the borders of that space (one could 
pose a similar question about the delimiters of time)? Godard’s answer to 
such a question, at least by way of Notre Musique, would appear to be a 
categorical “no.”  
 Returning to the appearance of SFOR in the film, SFOR remains a 
strong presence that establishes the conditions for the literary encounters 
conference and for the presence of the characters/persons in this geo-
political (and narrative) space. Their attendance at the conference is made 
possible by the security provided by SFOR and by the perimeter/border that 
SFOR established. Godard seems to be insistent about presenting the 
coexistence of these different terms and he undeniably reiterates this duality 
of force/discourse, violence/intellectual exchange throughout the film. 
Indeed, this imbrication of what some may consider mutually exclusive 
terms resonates with the film’s title. In his interview on the film, Godard 
remarks: 
I called it Notre musique: theirs, ours, everybody's. It's what makes 
us live, or makes us hope. One could say 'our philosophy' or 'our 
life', but 'our music' is nicer and has a different effect. And then 
there's also the question of what aspect of our music was destroyed 
at Sarajevo? And what remains of our music that was there?4  
I also suggest that “our music” or “our life” includes more broadly this 
ongoing framing of discourse by violence. Indeed, in terms of this film, we 
are inclined to regard Sarajevo itself as an ongoing construct, defined in turn 
by the city’s ethnic and religious presences, as well as by siege, by both 
hostile and peaceful occupation (“peaceful occupation” embodied by SFOR 
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in Sarajevo, to give one example, is a concept I return to when I discuss the 
“Paradise” section of the film), and by impulses of cosmopolitanism and 
parochialism. In keeping with the aesthetics of neo-realism that have 
consistently informed Godard’s work, the film presents Sarajevo as living 
and dynamic space and not as a mere set or backdrop (there are two 
prominent exceptions— the initial views of the National Library and the 
bridge at Mostar, which Godard frames as ready-mades or symbols). In 
rendering Sarajevo’s complexion in its various textures, Godard includes not 
only images of everyday life, architecture, and commerce, but also offers 
brief glimpses of past violence: bullet holes and scorch marks are visible on 
numerous buildings. Godard does not dwell on these details, nor are they 
even once the subject of commentary, but their presence in the visual field 
amid the details of daily life is unmistakable. They appear as scars of past 
traumas that remain present in daily life.  
 The presence of Spanish writer Juan Goytisolo in the film emphasizes 
these dynamics surrounding force, discourse, and trauma. Goytisolo 
appears as himself, one of several conference participants who gather at the 
Sarajevo airport early in the second part of the film. His novel El sitio de los 
sitios (1995; the English translation, State of Siege, was published in 2002) and 
several essays collected in Landscapes of War: From Sarajevo to Chechnya (2000) 
deal extensively with the Bosnian conflict, and his presence in the film 
continually references two different time periods: the present conference and 
the time of the Bosnian war. He and his work have been defined by the past 
violence. In the film, just after the above-referenced comments on SFOR, 
several conference participants drive to their destinations in the city and 
Goytisolo, interpreters, and other passengers have the following exchange 
(the editing and framing of the scene makes attribution of the different 
statements difficult at best, emphasizing instead a web of speakers, 
subjectivities, and interpreters): 
When Mr. Goytisolo was here in 1993, the Serbian front lines were 
here. Killing a man to defend an idea, isn’t defending an idea. It’s 
killing a man. 
When it’s all over, nothing is the same. Violence leaves a deep 
scar. A trace of the oblivion always remains. The trust in the world 
that terror destroys is irretrievable. To see your fellow man turn on 
you breeds a feeling of deep-rooted horror. Violence severs the 
lifeline. A survivor is not only changed, he’s someone else. The 
dream of survival becomes a nightmare for he who is on the 
journey. Each of us can become a danger for others. The body is a 
potential weapon. Knowing where we can be harmed, each of us 
can harm another.  
The counterpoint in the film between physical and psychological 
traumas (between ruined physical structures and battered subjectivities) 
exceeds a mere assertion that these two conditions co-exist in the aftermath 
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of violence.  The film dwells instead on the radical transformation of day-to-
day connections and relations that attends such traumas. “Violence severs 
the lifeline. A survivor is not only changed, he’s someone else. . . . Each of us 
can become a danger for others.” Such statements point to a categorical 
break in connections between subjects, but also to radical transformations of 
subjectivity. This break however is not absolute. Yet, the conditions for 
productive discourse have to be both salvaged and recreated, as if (to 
paraphrase the film) entire languages need to be rediscovered.  
 
The Bridge: Finding Language 
 This metaphor concerning language emerges most prominently in the 
film in the sequence involving the bridge at Mostar. Indeed, this sequence, 
which involves the bridge’s destruction and restoration, provides a template 
for the working of the entire film along the arc of destruction/trauma, 
possibilities of recovery, and imagined futures. It’s an approximately 7 
minute-long sequence that breaks down as follows: 
 • documentary footage of the bridge’s destruction in 1993 
 • a scene of pedagogy in a primary school in Bosnia-Herzegovina. 
 • a scene involving the physical recovery and reconstruction of 
the bridge 
 • a scene in which we witness a journalist (one the film’s fictional 
characters) visit and document the reconstruction site.  
That this series of events and processes is initiated by and framed by 
violence is certainly in keeping with the film’s commentary on discourse and 
violence. The documentary footage, moreover, has been slowed down and 
color-enhanced creating a highly aestheticized image of destruction. The 
effect of this video manipulation is to reduce the documentary quality or so-
called “truth content” of the image and to replace it with a seemingly 
irrational sensory appeal. These images of the bridge’s destruction could 
easily be described by some viewers as “beautiful” or “breath-taking;” there 
is an arresting aesthetic texture to them. Godard’s treatment of this footage 
echoes the entire first section of the film (discussed below) in which images 
of violence have been “contaminated” with color and motion. The image of 
the bridge’s destruction becomes a founding image for the sequence, 
followed by various scenes in which numerous constituencies of different 
generations, ethnicities, religions, and nationalities try (in some cases quite 
literally) to pick up the pieces. The film shows an enormous forensic scene 
with the ruins of the bridge laid out over a large expanse. A worker at the 
scene says, “the stones were salvaged and each stone was identified in terms 
of its position in the original bridge and where it had fallen in the river.”5 
This operation literally attempts to bridge the ruin or the aftermath with the 
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original state—tracking every component of the bridge as it fragments and 
falls (figures 6).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(The forensic scene at the Mostar bridge. Each stone is identified. 
“It was like re-discovering the origin of language.”) 
The voice-over continues, “ it was like rediscovering the origin of language . 
. . we must at once restore the past and make the future possible.” This 
statement, linking a salvage operation to the creation of the new, may reveal 
some of the reasoning by Godard’s 4-part structure of the sequence. It’s not 
just a scene of destruction and rebuilding, but also of pedagogy and 
reporting. With the narratives created by the teacher and the journalist, the 
trajectory of the scene points from the past into the future. The teacher 
instructs young students on the history of the bridge back to its design and 
construction in the 16th century, whereas the idealistic journalist is on a 
mission to tell a story about reconciliation and an emergent future.  
 But the film categorically refuses any clear pathway to reconciliation, 
forgiveness, recovery or reconstruction. Reconstructing the bridge in its pure 
original form from the original stones turns out to be an impossibility. 
Godard reminds us that the reconstructed bridge required newly-quarried 
stones. Godard also puts especial scrutiny on the work of the journalist. She 
is introduced early in the film as a young idealist, travelling to Sarajevo 
because she “wanted to see a place where reconciliation seemed possible.” 
Her self-imposed assignment includes interviewing the acclaimed 
Palestinian poet Mahmoud Darwish and the French ambassador to Bosnia 
who had sheltered Jews from Vichy authorities during WWII. The journalist 
is clearly committed to opening up channels of discourse among numerous 
parties. She openly states that she wants to take part in “conversations that 
no one can have. Not even in one’s heart, because that heart is alone.” Her 
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conversation with Darwish is marked by long periods of listening allowing 
Darwish’s points to slowly and convincingly unfold. In spite of the fact that 
this journalist would appear to offer a model for open discourse and 
reconciliation, Godard’s portrayal of her at the Mostar bridge shows her in a 
somewhat myopic state, embracing ready-made formulas and seeking 
verification of pre-conceived ideas. She casually takes snapshots of the 
bridge with a small camera, and upon seeing three native-Americans that 
appear at different moments of the film, she snaps a photo of them in the 
vicinity of the bridge (but the bridge is not in the background). Godard 
breaks down the sequence into four components: 1) the journalist 
photographs the bridge (figure 7);  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(The journalist with her viewfinder, seeking the ready-made.) 
2) We see and hear the native Americans getting into their car; 3) the 
journalist turns 180 degrees and photographs the native Americans; 4) We 
see the fabricated reality of the journalist—the impossible image of the 
native Americans in full regalia standing in front of the bridge (figure 8).  
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(The native Americans appear as a phantasm in full traditional 
regalia, rather than as flesh-and-blood, contemporary subjects.) 
Not only have the clothing and physical bearing of the native Americans 
changed, their position in relation to her has changed. This progression of 
shots highlights the difference between the material reality of the world 
before the journalist and what she chooses to see. With this sequence 
Godard calls attention to the difference between the datum of vision and the 
discursive and imaginative realm of the visible. The scene before the 
journalist is not what she actually sees. Her efforts at documentation result 
in another moment of erasure as the native-Americans are cast according to 
her preconceptions and not by their on-going efforts at self-definition. The 
journalist with her viewfinder, seeks the ready-made or the already 
understood. She is not using her camera to see (or to return to Godard’s 
remarks about using a camera, she is not using it as analytical instrument), 
but to reconstruct what she already knows.  
 
Hauntings in the Library 
 The native-Americans appear, somewhat inexplicably, at various 
moments of the film and remain all but invisible to those around them. They 
wander through the film like ghosts, attempting to engage others and to be 
heard. Although they are noticed, they are never acknowledged (with the 
exception of somewhat hostile encounter in the library where a member of 
the library staff attempts to wrest a book away from the native-American 
woman). Their presence is actually a narrative disturbance. Upon watching 
the film, one is inclined to ask, “what are they doing in the film?” They are 
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never integrated into the film as other characters are. They have no “place.” 
They appear not to be conference attendees, tourists, residents, nor 
journalists, but specters. Yet, they are categorically flesh-and-blood. They 
appear first and most notably during the scene in which Juan Goytisolo 
visits the burned-out National Library in Sarajevo. There they attempt to 
speak to another library visitor. This encounter, however, is entirely 
asymmetrical. The man they address never acknowledges their existence or 
appears to hear their words, but remains at the table bent over a book, while 
the native Americans become more and more emphatic, frustrated perhaps 
that their words seem to be falling on deaf ears. At this point, because of 
their seeming invisibility, it may be tempting to regard these characters as 
apparitions. Yet, as mentioned above, a library worker approaches the group 
and confronts the native American woman, thereby confirming their 
physicality. They are part of the diegesis but also outside of it.  
 By setting this encounter in the ruins of the Bosnian national library, 
Godard is once again placing viewers into a mise-en-abyme. The native 
Americans are attempting to fight off systematic erasure and to gain a voice 
in the very site of another episode of genocide and erasure. The destruction 
of the library was not a form of so-called, “collateral damage” during the 
Bosnian war, it was deliberately targeted with incendiary shells by Serbian 
forces in August 1992. Because it was a non-military target having no 
strategic value and because the incendiary ordinance was clearly meant to 
destroy the library’s contents, the destruction of the library is often regarded 
emblematically, as an example of the exceptionally high civilian and cultural 
Bosnian losses during the war. A New York Times article on the 
reconstruction of the library reminds us that only three months before the 
shelling of the national library, Serbian forces “shelled the Sarajevo Oriental 
Institute, devastating a collection of medieval literature in Arabic, Persian 
and Turkish and priceless works in four alphabets -- Latin, Arabic, Cyrillic 
and an alphabet that predated Cyrillic, known as Old Bosnian.”6 Similarly 
unique and irreplaceable artifacts were lost from the destruction of the 
national library. Facts such as these, along with the high number of crimes 
(rape, murder, destruction of property, and forced displacement) against the 
civilian population, corroborate the notion that much of the Bosnian war 
concerned cultural erasure and cultural survival. The same New York Times 
article states that “the burned ruins of Bosnia's national library have stood 
for the last four years as a wrenching symbol of an attempt to destroy a city 
and its culture.” Yet, in this very space, Godard stages a confrontation that 
highlights the invisibility of yet another constituency. Godard presents the 
native-Americans as remainders, outside of the realm or possibility of 
discourse. They are suddenly and categorically “placed” by the journalist in 
the scene involving the Mostar bridge, where they become exotics and 
instantly recognizable as symbol or type. In becoming “visible” they again 
are placed into obscurity. One has to wonder why the native Americans 
remain “out of place” throughout the film.  The fictional portion of the film 
B u r l i n  B a r r  |  8 1  
Journal of French and Francophone Philosophy  |  Revue de la philosophie française et de langue française 
Vol XVIII, No 2 (2010)  |  jffp.org  | DOI 10.5195/jffp.2010.213 
begins in an airport where people arrive from around the globe, for the sake 
of “encounters.” Numerous images and scenes foreground linguistic 
difference. Yet, in the context of this cosmopolitan setting, Godard 
introduces an element of radical alterity. The native Americans disturb the 
narrative and disalign straightforward readings of the film. But this is the 
point, I believe, in their appearance. They remind us of the fact of alterity 
and of the necessity of its presence. 
 
Paradise, Hell, and the Loss of Otherness 
They say our language arbitrarily divides up things in reality, and they 
say this as if it were our fault.  
—Godard speaking, from Notre Musique 
The film itself is organized by images of violence and military presence, 
with three clearly demarcated parts, labeled Kingdom 1 Hell, Kingdom 2 
Purgatory, and Kingdom 3 Paradise. It is noteworthy that Godard uses the 
term kingdom (royaume), rather than “part” or “act.” The emphasis is not 
on literary or dramatic organization but on a format that emphasizes 
arrangements of power and the state. Moreover, Godard adapts the 
Dantesque journey through the realms of the dead into a journey through 
different geo-political possibilities. All of the sequences discussed so far in 
this essay appear in “Kingdom 2 Purgatory.” “Purgatory “ is the space of 
discourse in the film; it constitutes the majority of the film (about one hour 
of the film’s 80 minute running-time), and establishes the semi-fictionalized 
diegetic world of Sarajevo, the conference, and its participants. The other 
two sections remain abstract in terms of space and time; each is roughly 10 
minutes in length and they book-end the purgatory section with worlds in 
which discourse appears to be either impossible, unimagined, or undesired.  
 Kingdom 1 (Hell) is a striking ten-minute montage primarily of 
military violence. A narrator states, “And so, in the age of fable, after the 
floods there appeared on earth men armed for extermination.” The montage 
that follows combines a plethora of images that intercuts passages from 
fiction films with documentary sequences (this montage bears many 
similarities to Godard’s De l’origine du XXIe siècle, discussed by Michael 
Walsh in this volume). There are scenes of actual conflict and of conflict’s 
aftermath; of material damage and of human death; of weaponry and of 
individual soldiers. The fictional footage offers images of historical periods 
spanning centuries, as well as ethnic and religious clashes (colonial wars and 
crusades). There are images of children “playing war” and of child victims 
of war. It would be an understatement to say that the montage is visually 
arresting. As mentioned earlier, Godard often manipulates the images—
aestheticizing them with intense color saturation or by slowing the film 
speed. The resulting images are often suffused with an uncanny sensual 
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beauty and offer explosions of color and compelling pyrotechnics that 
overlay the photographic documents. With these effects, the sequence 
highlights the very texture of cinematographic representation. Moreover, the 
different image types (fictional stagings and historical actuality) are intercut 
and placed side-by-side as if they are two parts of an intimate conversation: 
two different qualities of the image—one documentary and one not; one 
premised on a faith in the real, and one premised on a discourse (something 
other than a lens) that produces images; the real and the imaginary; 
documentary and fiction; shot and counter-shot. The montage refuses 
hierarchies; neither image type is privileged. In fact, each image type is 
pulled into the realm of the other, and both remain emphatically images: not 
historical documents, not documentary evidence, and also not mere 
dramatization.  
 The sequence dwells on the notion of perception and the field of 
representation in other ways as well. It calls attention to the materiality of 
the medium itself by foregrounding “broken” images. Several of the archival 
images are scratched, almost to the point of illegibility, and take on a 
Brakhage-like quality (figure 9).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(The scratched and broken images call attention to the materiality of 
the medium.) 
The damaged film stock and intense contrasts created by color saturation 
lend the images an almost palpable texture. Godard evokes yet another 
strata of perception with a brief image that features the shadow of a military 
helicopter, photographed from inside the vehicle itself (figure 10).  
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(Photographing one’s own shadow. Three strands of representation: 
self-portrait, shadow, helicopter.) 
Perhaps a sly reference to the shadow images in Plato’s allegory, it certainly 
references apparatus and materiality at once. Upon seeing this image one 
might immediately say “helicopter”,“shadow” or even “self-portrait,” each 
of which would be accurate and each of which calls attention to a different 
aspect of the image and its creation.  
 By making the “Hell” sequence “thick” with textuality and presence, 
transparency and materiality, Godard is doing more than simply rehearsing 
the long tensions concerning truth and actuality, and whether the external 
world is 1) discovered and recorded as so much data, or 2) discursively 
created. This montage, on its own and in the greater context of the film, 
insists on a synthesis of visions. Godard appears to be systematically 
broadening the practice of montage, from the collision of image content to 
include the collision of content, image type, color, texture, and matter. 
Montage practitioners including Sergei Eisenstein, Alexander Dovzhenko, 
Dziga Vertov, Stan Brakhage, Chris Marker, and Abigail Child, have 
plumbed these various depths for some time, but Godard’s sequence is 
remarkable in its scope. This specific practice of montage speaks to my 
earlier remark concerning the journalist’s “misperception” of the native 
Americans. By calling attention to the difference between the datum of 
vision and the discursive and imaginative realm of the visible, Godard 
seems to be suggesting not that the journalist is “seeing improperly” but that 
such “misperceptions” are a fact, just as difference is a fact. Godard’s 
collision of images in the montage sequence are not an attempt to make us 
see the world in a particular way, nor to celebrate (in a Vertovian vein) a 
range of visual possibilities that extend the range of human vision. Instead, 
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the montage interrogates perception itself and offers a meditation on the 
limits of vision. The film insists, by my reading, that perception always 
requires eye and mind together. In his lecture sequence, Godard states:  
Try to see.  
Try to imagine.  
In the first case, you say: “Look at that.”  
In the second, you say: “Close your eyes.” 
But keeping eyes closed and open at once poses some challenges. How is a 
synthesis of imagination and seeing to be arrived at? Godard’s formulation 
appears to offer a simple binarism, but perhaps it also calls for a third term. 
Another statement from the lecture carries a similar tone: he states that if 
one simply looks at “two pictures of the same moment in history then you 
see that truth has two faces.” This statement is not an assertion of subjective 
relativism, but of concrete reality. And often the third position or the third 
term is the means of acknowledging the existence of each of the two faces. 
 I maintain that the third term is ever-present in the film. It is there, in 
the form of a silent witness, from the first conversation of Kingdom 2, when 
Godard and the interpreter meet and converse in the airport (see figures 4-
5). This conference worker, who remains unnamed and unaddressed 
throughout the film, hails the attendees as they arrive (holding a sign in the 
airport lobby), and she is a visual focal point in the conversation between 
Godard and the interpreter, even though she never speaks (or only to say 
that she is checking on the status of a flight). A caterer during the scene of 
the embassy party receives similar attention from the camera, as he moves 
through the room with glasses of champagne. Although such moments as 
these serve to make visible the subaltern, it would be insufficient to leave the 
reading there.  With Godard’s studied refusal of the classic shot/counter-
shot system and by positing these so-called “marginal” subjectivities 
throughout the film, the film is constantly positing alterity as a position of 
witnessing and perception. The speakers often don’t look. Those who look 
often don’t speak. Be it in the form of a translator, a secondary audience, or a 
person waiting in the wings for the end of a lecture, there seems always to 
be a third or fourth eye on each exchange. This position of alterity becomes 
the space both of invisibility and perception.  
 Kingdoms 1 and 2 are rife with otherness, and even radical otherness. 
But, the final section of the film—labeled “Paradise”—offers a world of 
seemingly banal coexistence: it is an anonymous, bucolic, rural setting, lush 
with greenery, and featuring people in states of play and leisure. The colors 
of paradise are vibrant, and the light is uniform and brilliant. With the 
exception of the US marines, who guard the entrance, there seem to be no 
roles and no constituencies. Paradise is a protected space, not unlike a gated 
community. The ongoing conflict of Kingdom 1 has been replaced by a state 
of peaceful occupation. Although the sequence is playful in many respects, it 
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also has an elegiac tone. And in keeping with the rest of the film, even the 
fanciful tone of this sequence resonates with actuality. Currently, with U.S. 
military bases in over 150 countries, the vision at the end of the film is 
hardly far-fetched, and if one adds NATO forces to the formula then it’s 
easy to conclude that much of the globe is under a state of permanent 
militarization that theoretically advances peace. It seems that no space, even 
paradise, can be conceived of without the delimiters of the military force.  
 If Kingdom 1 is a state in which no form of alterity can be 
acknowledged except through violence (hence eradication) then Kingdom 
three is a state in which alterity seems to be absent altogether. This vision of 
paradise offers a non-violent form of eradication. Paradise is a place where 
misperceptions no longer occur because there is no form of alterity. I 
mentioned earlier that many of the shots from the film hold some subjects in 
sharp focus and leave others in visual obscurity. This use of planes and 
shallow focus creates a series of visual phantoms that populate many frames 
of the film (figure 3) and threaten to emerge from the shadows or from 
unfocused planes. Likewise, the Native Americans emerge unexpectedly, 
and seem to appear from a zone inflected by reality and a cultural 
imaginary. The overly secured paradise, however, seems to clear up the 
picture. Like the sanitized shot/counter shot formulation so reviled by 
Godard, this paradise finally serves up visual clarity, but there is nothing to 
see.  
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